Seventeen. The number that explains everything about AI and blue-collar jobs in India
Seventeen. That is the net number of employees added by India’s five largest IT services companies — TCS, Infosys, Wipro, HCLTech and Tech Mahindra — across the first nine months of FY 2025-26. In the same period a year earlier, that figure was 17,764.
In his Times of India column, technology thinker Jaspreet Bindra uses that single statistic as the hinge for a much larger argument: the conversation about AI and blue-collar jobs has been running backwards. We assumed automation would come for the factory floor first and leave the office untouched. Bindra’s reading of the data suggests the opposite is happening — and that this reversal could hand skilled manual work a status it has never enjoyed in India.
For decades, India’s IT majors were the country’s most dependable employment machine, absorbing thousands of young engineers straight out of college every year. Bindra’s point is blunt: that machine is now sputtering. And when the machine sputters, the entire social contract built around it starts to crack.
The broken bargain at the heart of the AI and blue-collar jobs debate
Bindra connects the hiring collapse to something bigger — the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protests, which he believes the number explains better than most of the commentary written about them.
The bargain young Indians were sold was simple: study hard, clear increasingly competitive exams, get a degree, and a respectable job follows. Bindra asks the question that bargain can no longer answer — what happens when the exam is compromised, the degree is devalued, and the job at the end of it no longer exists?
The supporting evidence he cites is stark:
- Four out of every five unemployed Indians are under 30.
- Unemployment among graduates is significantly higher than among people who cannot read or write.
- Real wages have stayed largely stagnant.
- Many government skilling programmes produce certificates without producing employment.
The result is mass overqualification. Engineers become construction supervisors. Postgraduates take up data-entry assignments. Graduates enter poorly paid gig work with no security and no career ladder. As Bindra frames it, the anger over exams is really anger over what lies at their end.
AI is removing the bottom rung of the white-collar ladder
This is where Bindra’s argument about AI and blue-collar jobs gets sharp. The first tasks being automated, he observes, are precisely the ones traditionally handed to young entrants: preparing presentations, summarising documents, writing basic code, conducting basic research, checking contracts, creating routine reports.
These were never merely low-value tasks. They were how young people learnt to work. The apprenticeship was embedded in the drudgery. Remove the drudgery, and you remove the on-ramp.
“The bottom rung of the white-collar ladder is not simply becoming harder to reach,” Bindra writes. “In some professions, it is being removed.”
His prescription for young people is layered. They will need genuine AI literacy — the ability to work with these systems, question their output, understand their limitations, and use them to become more capable in their chosen fields. Humanities, judgment, context and domain knowledge become more valuable as routine answers become cheaper to produce. Entrepreneurship becomes more practical, because one or two people equipped with AI can now build, market and operate businesses that once required much larger teams.
But the most important response, he suggests, may be the simplest: do what you were trained for.
The hierarchy flip: AI’s most unexpected employment effect
For decades, India turned mechanical, civil and electrical engineers into software engineers. A mechanical engineer maintaining machines was considered less successful than one writing code for an IT services company. An electrical engineer working on power systems received less prestige than someone preparing PowerPoints in a consulting firm.
Bindra’s central claim is that the AI economy may reverse that hierarchy — because the AI economy is not made only of models and software.
It needs electricians. HVAC technicians. Welders. Construction workers. Maintenance engineers. Solar technicians. Equipment operators. People who can build and repair things in the physical world.
This, he argues, may be AI’s most unexpected employment effect: a technology associated with replacing labour could produce a renaissance of skilled blue-collar and grey-collar work.
What India should do about AI and blue-collar jobs
Bindra doesn’t leave it as observation. His policy ask is specific and quotable.
Instead of opening more engineering colleges whose graduates chase a shrinking pool of generic office jobs, India needs IIT/IIM-grade institutes for data centre electricians, robotic machinists, healthcare technicians, solar installers and drone operators.
Critically — and this is the part most likely to be ignored — these must not be positioned as remedial institutions for those who supposedly failed academically. They must be aspirational institutions with credible employment pathways.
The real obstacle is prejudice, not technology
Bindra is clear-eyed about what stands in the way. India has long treated white-collar work as intellectually and socially superior to work performed with tools, machines, bodies or hands.
A young person earning ₹5 lakh at an IT company is routinely regarded as more successful than a shopkeeper, physiotherapist or pet-care professional earning twice as much.
He traces this prejudice to two sources: caste and feudal attitudes toward manual labour, and the post-liberalisation worship of engineering degrees, MBAs and “techie” office jobs.
What struck him about the CJP protests was their social imagination. The protesters were not separated by corporate designation, college pedigree, caste hierarchy or the colour of their collars. They appeared simply as young Indians confronting a system they believed had failed them — a rough equality born from a shared fear about the future.
“That equality must now extend to work,” Bindra writes. “The technician, nurse, farmer, physiotherapist and welder are no less essential than the consultant, coder or manager.”
He closes by citing UK leader Andy Burnham: “I want an education system based on parity between academic and technical which gives all young people a clear path in life. From today, Britain will value the hard hat every bit as much as the graduation cap.”
India’s employment future, Bindra concludes, may depend on recognising that blue-collar and white-collar work are different — but neither is inferior to the other.
Jaspreet Bindra is the founder of AI&Beyond and author of “Winning With AI: Your Guide to AI Literacy.”
Jaspreet Bindra’s key points at a glance
| # | Key point |
|---|---|
| 1 | India’s top 5 IT firms added a net 17 employees in 9M FY25-26, vs 17,764 a year earlier. The employment machine is sputtering. |
| 2 | This number explains the CJP protests better than most commentary — the study-hard-get-a-job bargain has broken. |
| 3 | 4 in 5 unemployed Indians are under 30; graduate unemployment exceeds that of the illiterate. |
| 4 | AI is automating entry-level white-collar tasks first — the very tasks through which young people learnt to work. |
| 5 | The bottom rung of the white-collar ladder isn’t just harder to reach; in some professions it’s being removed. |
| 6 | AI literacy, judgment, context, domain knowledge and humanities become more valuable, not less. |
| 7 | Entrepreneurship becomes practical — 1-2 people with AI can run what once needed large teams. |
| 8 | The AI economy needs electricians, HVAC techs, welders, solar technicians, maintenance engineers, equipment operators. |
| 9 | AI’s most unexpected effect: a renaissance of skilled blue-collar and grey-collar work. |
| 10 | India needs IIT/IIM-calibre institutes for technical trades — aspirational, not remedial. |
| 11 | The barrier is prejudice rooted in caste, feudal attitudes and post-liberalisation degree worship. |
| 12 | Parity of esteem between the hard hat and the graduation cap is now an economic necessity. |